

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPU #0130/01 0191955
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191955Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2106
RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0011
INFO RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL//OLE/OI//

S E C R E T PORT AU PRINCE 000130

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD
FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2020
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PINS](#) [PINR](#) [PHUM](#) [HA](#) [JO](#)
SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH UN ASG FOR PEACEKEEPING

REF: A. USUN 0092

[1](#)B. TD-314/0336-06
[1](#)C. CARNEY-DUDDY TELCON 13 JANUARY

Classified By: CDA Timothy M. Carney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Ass't Sec'y Gen'l Hedi Annabi (strictly protect) of DPKO came over for dinner a deux at the Residence 18 January to talk the issues: a Deputy SRSG position still MIA; Haitian pressure on SRSG Valdes to perform better; weakness in Jordanian military performance and possible U.S. actions to help deter violence on election day.

[1](#)2. (C) Annabi, an old friend from UN efforts in Cambodia of the late 80s, confirmed he is in Haiti to bolster morale (ref A) and focus on political affairs, elections, military, police, justice, civil affairs and immediate post-electoral economic stabilization. He had already met with Haitian presidential candidates, and with the Jordanian Troop component commander. I lamented the continuing UN failure to provide an experienced Deputy to SRSG Valdes. He noted that an American (Kennedy) had agreed to the job, and SG Kofi Annan had approved the assignment after which the candidate backed out. A set of further candidates, including another American, are in the final stages. I argued that whoever is picked must have the stature to run MINUSTAH for the interim period between Valdes' departure and nomination of a new SRSG.

[1](#)3. (C) In discussing Haitian private sector and civil society criticism of SRSG Valdes, I explained that leaders have targeted the SRSG because they believe only he can energize the MINUSTAH Force to deal with the reality of, and prospects for, further deterioration in security. They particularly cite the Jordanian component's incompetence in the Cite Soleil slum area of operations. (NOTE: PM Latortue called the SRSG together with civil society/business leaders Andy Apaid and Reginald Boulos on 18 January. Valdes told me the good meeting proceeded in a civil atmosphere with focus on solving problems. Civil society leaders have ended mass action against MINUSTAH, we understand. END NOTE) I added that I had seen the SG's letter to PM Latortue, elements of which are in the press, defending Valdes, describing criticism of him as "defamation" and asserting the criticism is "unjustified."

[1](#)4. (S/NF) Annabi readily accepted my observation, based on UN assignments in Cambodia, Somalia and South Africa, that UN Missions all have weaknesses. I recounted 13 January observations to me by ICRC ResRep Cedric Piralla (protect). He cited NGO figures for civilian casualties in Cite Soleil

as having risen from 100 wounded in October to between 170 and 205 in December. Half of these are women and children. Assertions that all were used as human shields strain credulity. He noted that Jordanians fired 28,000 cartridges in December, an astonishing figure even given that the troops frequently shoot in the air. ICRC plans to raise these issues in writing with the Acting Force Commander. Annabi mentioned that he, too, was struck by the very large expenditure of ammunition. He said that Jordanian military leadership has proven poor in a number of missions other than Haiti (ref B), and that Prince Zeid, the Jordanian Permrep who himself spent a period as a mid-ranking member of a UN peace-keeping mission, is aware of the problem. Annabi added that he had seen the Jordanian Commander here who said flatly that his forces would not enter Cite Soleil. The officer needs to be removed, he concluded, adding that the entire Jordanian unit must be transferred elsewhere in Haiti and different units brought in. We raised moving the Pakistani Formed Police Unit (100 strong) currently in Gonaive that actually has armored vehicles with it, as well as body armor and, perhaps, bringing up the rest of the Peruvians and the Uruguayans and putting the Jordanians in the much more peaceful south, but concluded this could not happen before the first round of elections.

15. (S/NF) In further discussing electoral security, I described to Annabi the PM's 14 January ideas (ref. C) about adding an important psychological element of deterrence against election-day violence through the presence of first world military. Annabi confirmed that the idea had come from the SRSB and that New York favors it. The PM had spoken to me of bringing in Canadian or French forces for a short period and asked that the U.S., if it could not put a unit on the ground, instead send Navy and Coast Guard ships to be present three or four days before the elections and then on election day. He suggested that, if possible, crews resume the practice of civic action works or, even, tourism, and that definitely helicopters from the ship should be seen regularly in the skies around the capital. I doubted that civic action efforts would be possible, but mooted a possible shipboard lunch for the President or PM, and use of helicopters to carry command staff of the ship to lunch at the U.S. Residence. I told Annabi that Washington is seized with the matter.

CARNEY